In preparation for a hearing scheduled by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation for May 22, 2001, we prepared testimony highlighting several key issues pertaining to Amtrak’s financial condition and capital funding requirements. Copies of the testimony were delivered to the Committee in advance of the hearing in accordance with Committee rules; however, the hearing was postponed to an unspecified later date. A copy of that testimony was sent to you last week and I am including another copy with this revised transmittal.

Because several of the issues we planned to highlight during this hearing relate to immediate concerns, including Amtrak’s cash flow constraints, we believe it is important to put the points raised in the testimony on the formal record, both for your consideration and that of the appropriate congressional committees.

In 1997, the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act tasked our office with performing an annual assessment of Amtrak’s financial performance and requirements in every year that Amtrak requests Federal assistance. We began our fourth such assessment in January and expect to issue a final report with our findings in September. Our work to date has shown that despite improved revenues and ridership, Amtrak’s financial condition remains serious. Specifically, there are three areas of concern, each of which has contributed to Amtrak’s current cash flow shortfalls: Amtrak’s financial performance, Acela
delays, and Amtrak’s capital funding needs. The enclosed testimony statement covers these issues in greater depth.

Amtrak’s revenues and ridership have grown steadily in the past 2 years, and in the first 6 months of 2001, Amtrak’s passenger revenues are up 11.8 percent over the same period last year and ridership is up 7 percent. Still, expense growth has kept pace, and as a result, Amtrak’s cash losses have not declined.

One of the drivers behind expense growth is the interest expense associated with the level of debt Amtrak has assumed in recent years to finance new equipment purchases. As of September 2000, Amtrak’s long-term debt and capital lease obligations totaled $2.8 billion, an increase of $1 billion over 1999. In 1994, Amtrak’s annual interest expenses on borrowing totaled $24 million, but by 2002, interest expenses will total approximately $191 million and will remain at that level until 2005. These projections include an estimated $27 million in interest related to the recently completed financing of a portion of Penn Station-New York.

![Interest Expenses Including New Interest Expenses related to PSNY Transaction](image)

Amtrak’s capital needs in 2002 and 2003 far exceed the Federal appropriations Amtrak anticipates receiving in those years. Furthermore, that level of funding is not adequate if Amtrak is to remain viable beyond 2003. Deferred investment is beginning to catch up with Amtrak, and the reliability of passenger services will decline if significant investment is not forthcoming.

The combination of these factors suggests that the debate on Amtrak’s future may not wait until 2003. I understand that you will recommend to Congress that hearings should be held earlier, rather than later, in 2002 on the subject of Amtrak’s future and the future of intercity passenger rail. We endorse this position.
We will continue to monitor Amtrak’s financial performance and capital needs as part of our congressionally mandated annual assessment and will report on our findings in September. Our initial plan was to report in July; however, Amtrak’s limited staff resources have been consumed by numerous oversight requests this Spring, and this has delayed Amtrak’s responses to our questions concerning its business plan. If I can answer any questions or be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me at (202) 366-1959 or my Acting Deputy, Todd J. Zinser, at (202) 366-6767.

Enclosure
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for providing us the opportunity to comment on Amtrak’s financial performance and its short and long-term capital funding needs. In 1997, the Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act tasked our office with performing an annual assessment of Amtrak’s financial performance and requirements in every year that Amtrak requests Federal assistance. We began our fourth such assessment in January and will issue a final report with our findings in July.

Our work to date has shown that Amtrak has improved its revenues and ridership. Amtrak’s passenger revenues in 2000 approached $1.2 billion, growing 10 percent over 1999 to set a new record. In the first 6 months of 2001, passenger revenues are up another 11.8 percent, and ridership is up 7 percent. Despite this progress, Amtrak’s financial condition remains precarious and it is urgent that it reduce expenses. There are three gauges of Amtrak’s performance and each one presents an area of substantial concern.

- **Financial Performance.** Amtrak’s cash loss of $561 million in 2000 was $18 million better than 1999, but $120 million worse than Amtrak planned, largely due to Acela delays. By law, Amtrak may not use Federal funds for operating expenses after December 2, 2002. To meet this mandate, Amtrak must reduce its cash loss by over $100 million each year in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Amtrak’s rate of improvement in the next 2 years must be significantly more aggressive than its improvement rate in the past 2 years. Amtrak is in the 4th year of its 5-year glidepath, and there still remain a significant number of to-be-determined management actions that must be defined. If Amtrak fills those gaps this year, only under the very best of circumstances will there likely be sufficient time for the new plans to bear fruit before Amtrak’s mandated deadline.

- **Acela Delays.** New delays in the delivery of Acela Express trainsets will mean that Amtrak will continue to experience lost revenues in 2002. Amtrak has in large part compensated for the revenue losses associated with the delays in 2000 and 2001 through a variety of actions including short-term borrowing. However, Amtrak’s line of credit will be fully utilized this summer and Amtrak will need to find other sources of external financing if it is to meet its cash-flow requirements in the short term.

- **Capital Funding Shortfalls.** The Federal appropriations Amtrak anticipates receiving in 2002 and 2003 are not sufficient to meet Amtrak’s capital needs in those years; nor is the level of funding adequate if Amtrak is to remain viable beyond 2003. Amtrak has deferred investment in past years because of capital shortfalls and these deferrals are beginning to catch up. The
reliability of Amtrak’s service is suffering and will continue to worsen if significant investment is not forthcoming. For example, in the Northeast Corridor, minutes of delay related to communication and signals problems and electric traction problems have increased by 55 percent and 100 percent, respectively, in the past 2 years. Amtrak’s capital needs are substantial and even if the high-speed rail investment bond bill is passed, Amtrak would still need about $750 million each year in Federal appropriations for its general capital investment needs and excess railroad retirement payments.

The combination of these factors suggests that the debate on Amtrak’s future and the future of intercity passenger rail should be held earlier, rather than later, in 2002.

**Amtrak’s Financial Improvement Has Been Limited and its Ability to Reach Operating Self-Sufficiency by 2003 is in Jeopardy.**

Amtrak’s overall financial results have not improved significantly since 1999. Amtrak’s 2000 operating loss of $944 million, including depreciation, was $28 million more than its 1999 loss and the largest in Amtrak’s history. Amtrak’s test for self-sufficiency, however, pivots on its cash losses rather than its operating losses. In 2000, the cash loss was $561 million, about $18 million better than 1999, but fell short of Amtrak’s business plan goals by $120 million.

In 2000 and the first 6 months of 2001, Amtrak’s revenue and ridership have continued to grow. Amtrak’s passenger revenues in 2000 approached $1.2 billion, growing 10 percent over 1999 to set a new record. In the first 6 months of 2001, passenger revenues are up another 11.8 percent, and ridership is up 7 percent.
Non-passenger revenues were up 15 percent in 2000 over 1999. Non-passenger revenues have become increasingly important to Amtrak and, totaling $886 million in 2000, they accounted for over 43 percent of Amtrak’s total revenues. In 1990, non-passenger revenues totaled $378 million and accounted for less than 29 percent of total revenues. An important component of the non-passenger revenues is the mail and express business, which generated $122 million in total revenues in 2000, an increase of nearly 25 percent from 1999.

Unfortunately, Amtrak has not been successful in curbing expense growth. In 2000, cash operating expenses increased by 8.6 percent over 1999. One of the drivers behind the growth is the interest expense associated with the level of debt Amtrak has assumed in recent years to finance new equipment purchases. As of September 2000, Amtrak’s long-term debt and capital lease obligations totaled $2.8 billion, an increase of $1 billion over 1999. In 1994, Amtrak’s annual
interest expenses on borrowing totaled $24 million; in 2000, that total was $86 million. The outlook for the future is worse – by 2002, interest expenses will total $164 million and will remain at that level until 2005. Projections for years beyond 2001 do not include interest related to any external financing that was not anticipated in January 2001 when the 2001 Strategic Business Plan was issued.

Congress has mandated that Amtrak reach operating self-sufficiency by 2003. Our position on the deadline is that, according to the 1997 law, Amtrak must operate after December 2, 2002 without Federal operating subsidies in order to achieve its mandate. Last September, when we testified before this Committee, we stated that time was running short for Amtrak to close the holes in its business plan and remain on track for reaching operating self-sufficiency by 2003. In our judgment today, Amtrak’s ability to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2003 is in serious jeopardy.

The new delays in delivery of Acela equipment will extend the financial losses associated with these delays into 2002. Amtrak is also in the process of substantially revising its mail and express revenue projections for the next few years and any reductions will require Amtrak to identify additional actions to compensate for these lost revenues. Finally, there still appear to be significant gaps in Amtrak’s business plan where no actions have been yet identified to curb continued expense growth. If Amtrak fills those gaps this year, only under the very best of circumstances will there likely be sufficient time for the new plans to bear fruit before Amtrak’s mandated deadline.

Amtrak has made progress in some areas although not as quickly as is probably necessary to meet its 2003 mandate. In order to maximize the financial benefits it will receive from these actions, Amtrak needs to vigorously pursue the following:
First, it must fully implement high-speed rail in the Northeast Corridor. When all 20 trainsets and 15 high-horsepower locomotives are in service, Amtrak estimates a net revenue contribution of close to $180 million each year. Delays in equipment delivery until December 2001 will extend losses associated with these delays into 2002. However, our initial findings in our current annual assessment indicate that given the growing airline delays, Amtrak’s projections for Acela revenue when fully ramped up may now, in fact, be overly conservative.

Second, Amtrak must make significant strides in curbing expense growth. Nearly all of the $737 million in undefined management actions in Amtrak’s 2000 business plan relate to expense reductions. The first step will be identifying concrete plans to fill the gap in the business plan, but definition is not enough. Amtrak must make these plans deliver. Amtrak’s success in improving revenues will be undermined unless it is equally successful in curbing expense growth.

Acela Delays Have Placed Amtrak in a Precarious Financial Position.

Bombardier has recently announced delays of an additional 3 months before delivery of the final (20th) Acela Express trainset. Delays to date have hurt Amtrak’s revenues in 2000 and 2001, and the most recent set of delays will mean that Amtrak will continue to forego revenue in 2002. Last time we came before this Committee, we testified that if there were no further extended delays, the Acela service would likely be able to reach its full operating and revenue potential in 2003. This is still possible, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for Amtrak to compensate for the revenues being lost each day the service does not operate.

Amtrak began operating one daily round-trip Acela Express train between Washington and Boston in December 2000. In the 5 months of operations, load factors have averaged 29 percent between Washington and New York and 47 percent between New York and Boston. These results are probably not a good indicator of how well the service will be received once Amtrak is able to offer consumers more time and frequency options. Amtrak’s ability to do so will depend upon the equipment delivery schedule. Amtrak has taken delivery of its 10th trainset and as of May 20th, has eight trainsets in service.

Delays in ramping up Acela Express have not only jeopardized Amtrak’s ability to maintain its glidepath and reach operating self-sufficiency as mandated in 2003, but they have also created a serious short-term cash flow problem. Amtrak has been able to offset past losses from the Acela delays with equipment sale-leasebacks and short-term borrowing, but cash losses from forgone Acela revenues have continued to accumulate. Amtrak’s short-term credit line will reach its
maximum level early in the summer and as a result, Amtrak must secure additional external financing to meet its short-term cash flow requirements.

Any transactions that involve borrowing will increase Amtrak’s already significant interest costs, which are operating expenses, and further raise the bar of improvements Amtrak will need to achieve in order to meet its operational self-sufficiency mandate. However, Amtrak’s options for securing the amount of funding needed are very limited. Amtrak’s cash-flow problems are a short-term situation that should abate with its 2002 Federal appropriation; however, the abatement is predicated on the full implementation of Acela service by January 2002.

**Amtrak’s Projected Capital Funding Will Fall Short of Its Capital Needs.**

If Amtrak is to succeed in achieving its mandate without starving the basic minimum infrastructure needs of the system, it will need additional capital funding in the short term. In the past few years, Amtrak has underspent on minimum needs -- the kinds of projects that maintain the sustainable integrity of its infrastructure, including operational reliability projects and life-safety needs. Instead, Amtrak has invested in capital projects designed to provide immediate revenues or cost savings, including interior and exterior redesign of passenger cars and planning services for new corridor development. Capital shortfalls have resulted in Amtrak deferring investment in basic needs, and the consequences are beginning to surface. Between 1998 and 2000, delays related to signals and communications more than doubled on the Northeast Corridor, and delays related to electric traction problems increased by 100 percent during this period.
Amtrak estimates that it will need $973 million in capital funding in 2002 and 2003 to pursue a state-of-good-repair capital investment strategy. Amtrak believes that this level of funding would be sufficient to ensure a quality national network for the provision of existing services; address the state-of-good repair needs for infrastructure, facilities and fleet; address life/safety needs, including investments required in the New York tunnels; and support a viable national system necessary for Amtrak to achieve and sustain operational self-sufficiency.

We have not verified Amtrak’s estimates, although our own estimates of Amtrak’s minimum capital needs for 2002 and 2003 are $370 million and $409 million, respectively. This bare bones level of funding would not be sufficient for Amtrak to adequately invest in its system if it is to remain viable beyond 2003, and would likely make it impossible for Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency in accordance with its mandate.

Even if Amtrak succeeds in reaching operating self-sufficiency, it will continue to need significant and sustained capital funding beyond 2003. In the foreseeable future, we see no set of circumstances where passenger and other revenues will be sufficient to fund the level of capital investment necessary to keep the railroad operating on a national level in good condition. Amtrak estimates that its total annual capital requirement is about $1.5 billion for addressing general capital needs, beginning to address a backlog of needs in the Northeast Corridor, and paying its share of developing new high-speed corridors.

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1 This is exclusive of the $190 million and $196 million Amtrak estimates it will need for excess RRTA payments in 2002 and 2003, respectively, to fund expenses associated with liabilities for Amtrak’s railroad retirement taxes that exceed the amount needed for the benefits of Amtrak retirees or funds needed for eligible operating expenses until December 2, 2002, when Amtrak is required to operate without Federal operating assistance.
First, Amtrak’s Financial Results Have Not Yet Turned The Corner.

Amtrak’s overall financial results have not improved significantly since 1999. Amtrak’s 2000 operating loss of $944 million, including depreciation, was $28 million more than its 1999 loss and the largest in Amtrak’s history.

Amtrak’s test for operating self-sufficiency, however, pivots on its cash losses rather than its operating losses. In 2000, the cash loss was $561 million, about $18 million better than 1999, but fell short of Amtrak’s business plan goals by $120 million. For the first 6 months of 2001, Amtrak’s cash loss was $318 million, which was $12 million worse than the same period last year, but $5 million better than plan. The following graph shows Amtrak’s operating and cash losses from 1990 to 2000.
The good news is that Amtrak’s passenger revenue and ridership showed marked improvement in 2000 and through the first 6 months of 2001. The bad news is that expense growth has kept pace. For Amtrak to achieve operating self-sufficiency by 2003, it must restrict the growth in expenses.

- **Revenue and ridership show continued growth.** Amtrak continued the revenue growth trends that began in 1995 and reported record passenger related revenue levels in 2000 of nearly $1.2 billion, a 10-percent increase over 1999. For the first 6 months of 2001, passenger related revenue grew by more than 11.8 percent to $587 million.

  Systemwide ridership in 2000 increased by nearly 5 percent over 1999 to 22.5 million, led by growth of better than 8 percent in Amtrak West and 5 percent in the Northeast Corridor business units. Intercity ridership increased by slightly over 1 percent. Consequently, the Intercity business unit fell short of its passenger revenue goals by $19 million. The graph on the following page illustrates Amtrak’s systemwide passenger revenue and ridership trends for the period 1990 to 2000.

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2 Amtrak has three Strategic Business Units (SBUs): Northeast Corridor (NEC), Intercity, and Amtrak West, and a separate Corporate Business Unit that includes Business Service Centers. NEC includes all the routes in the Northeast between Virginia and Maine. Amtrak West incorporates the West Coast routes in California and the Pacific Northwest, extending to Vancouver, British Columbia, and the routes in between. Intercity is the rest of the system across the middle of the country, including most long-distance trains.
Overall operating revenues increased in 2000 by 12.3 percent over 1999 and grew by 11.1 percent for the first 6 months of 2001. Non-passenger revenues showed exceptional growth in 2000, increasing more than 15 percent over 1999. Non-passenger revenues comprised an increasing share of Amtrak’s total revenues between 1990 and 2000. The overall increase in non-passenger revenues for the last 11 years has been 134 percent, going from $378 million in 1990 to $886 million in 2000.

The trend in non-passenger revenue is largely attributable to revenues generated through commuter and reimbursable maintenance-of-way contracts. An increasingly important source of non-passenger revenues is projected to come from the growth in Amtrak’s mail and express business. In 2000, mail and express revenues increased by about 25 percent over 1999 to
$122 million. Non-passenger activities now account for over 43 percent of Amtrak’s total operating revenues.

### Composition of Total Operating Revenue, 1990 to 2000

- **Expense growth has kept pace.** Although revenue and ridership trends have shown positive results, increases in labor costs, train operation expenses, depreciation, and maintenance-of-way expenses have fueled continued growth in operating expenses. In 2000, total operating expenses, including depreciation and other non-cash expenses, increased by 9.1 percent, or $250 million over 1999. On a cash basis, expenses increased 8.6 percent. For the first 6 months of 2001, operating expense growth accelerated by 11.2 percent – or 9.3 percent on a cash basis – over the same period in 2000.

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3 Non-passenger revenues include mail and express, commuter, reimbursable, commercial development, non-transportation, state reimbursement, and other transportation revenues.
As we reported in our assessment of Amtrak’s 2000 Strategic Business Plan, reducing Amtrak’s cash losses will depend heavily on limiting the growth in Amtrak’s expenses. Cutting expense growth is critical to Amtrak’s ability to achieve operating self-sufficiency because Amtrak’s overall level of expenses of $3 billion far outstrips total operating revenues of about $2.1 billion.

Furthermore, Amtrak has funded most of its recent reflecting efforts through external financing, which has resulted in significant growth in interest costs during the 1990’s and is projected to increase substantially from the 2000 expense level. If Amtrak had sufficient capital available to purchase equipment outright, rather than seeking outside financing, its interest expenses in 2003, Amtrak’s first year of operational self-sufficiency, would be approximately $75 million less. The following chart illustrates projected interest expense growth.

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5 The interest expenses shown are on a cash interest basis, not on an accrual basis.
- **Amtrak’s liquidity deteriorates and debt surges.** Amtrak faces a severely constrained cash flow in 2001. Current assets declined by almost $600 million between September 1999 and September 2000 while current liabilities increased over $94 million to $751 million. As a result, Amtrak’s working capital ratio went from 1.43 in 1999 to .45 in 2000, its lowest level since 1997.
The working capital ratio, which is calculated by dividing the value of current assets by current liabilities, is a measure of an entity’s ability to meet short-term liabilities.

Amtrak has managed to compensate, in part, for delays in the delivery of trainsets by increasing its short-term borrowing to enable it to meet its current obligations. However, Amtrak’s line of credit will reach its maximum level this summer and Amtrak will need to identify other sources for external financing.

Amtrak’s long-term debt and capital lease obligations totaled $2.8 billion as of September 2000, which was an increase of $1 billion over 1999. During 2000, Amtrak entered into four separate sale-leaseback transactions collectively involving 625 passenger cars. Amtrak set aside proceeds from the transactions that, combined with projected interest earnings on the proceeds, are expected to satisfy the future capital lease obligations. In addition, Amtrak received $124 million in net cash proceeds from the sale-leaseback transactions, which it used, in part, to cover revenue shortfalls in 2000 due to delays in implementing Acela Express and its mail and express business.
Key performance measures continue to fall short of goals. Two key performance measures for Amtrak are the Customer Satisfaction Index (Index) and on-time performance. Amtrak’s Index, which indicates the level of customer satisfaction with Amtrak’s overall service delivery, dropped from 83 (out of 100) in 1999 to 82 in 2000. As the following table indicates, all three business units fell short of their goals for 2000.

**Customer Satisfaction Index Results (Scale: 1 – 100)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Unit</th>
<th>1999 Actual</th>
<th>2000 Actual</th>
<th>2000 Goal</th>
<th>+/(-) 1999</th>
<th>+/(-) Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systemwide</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercity</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Corridor</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Amtrak reported systemwide on-time performance in 2000 of 78 percent, which was slightly below performance levels in 1999 and 1998. Similar to the performance in customer satisfaction, all three business units did not meet their goals in 2000. Amtrak cited scheduled and unscheduled track work, freight rail traffic interference, mechanical failures, and weather as the largest contributors to the poor performance.

**On Time Performance (percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business Unit</th>
<th>1999 Actual</th>
<th>2000 Actual</th>
<th>2000 Goal</th>
<th>+/(-) 1999</th>
<th>+/(-) Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systemwide</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercity</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Corridor</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To further bolster ridership, passenger retention, and revenue, Amtrak instituted a Customer Service Guarantee in July 2000. The guarantee provides passengers who are not satisfied with Amtrak’s service, for any reason, with vouchers for future travel equal to the value of the trip on which they were dissatisfied. Amtrak’s goal for the Customer Service Guarantee is that no more than 1 passenger in 1,000 (a 99.9 percent satisfaction rate) will request a voucher.

Between July 4, 2000 and April 30, 2001, Amtrak issued about 62,406 service guarantee vouchers with a total value of $5.48 million. Vouchers issued per 1,000 passengers was 3.3 systemwide, 8.4 in Intercity, 2 in Amtrak West, and 1.6 in the Northeast Corridor.

**Second, Lacking Indications Of Substantial Progress, Amtrak’s Ability To Reach Operating Self-Sufficiency By 2003 Is In Serious Jeopardy.** Our assessment of Amtrak’s 2000 business plan identified a number of elements that are unlikely to perform as Amtrak had expected. *If no corrective action were taken to compensate for them*, Amtrak’s cash loss would be about $1.4 billion more than it projected over the 4-year period 2001 through 2004. Most critically, we projected that in 2003, the year of operational self-sufficiency, Amtrak would still require $351 million more in operating assistance than it can fund with its Federal appropriation.
About 87 percent of the total amount we determined to be at risk in Amtrak’s 2000 business plan was concentrated in three elements of the plan: $737 million in undefined management actions, $304 million in Northeast Corridor passenger revenues, and $144 million in Mail and Express net revenues. I would like to say a few words about each of these elements.

- **Undefined Management Actions.** Amtrak’s FY 2000 business plan projected operating self-sufficiency largely on the back of the $737 million in undefined management actions. In essence, these undefined actions represent the gap between the total cash loss improvements Amtrak needs and what it expects to get from actions it has already identified. We have not examined the support for Amtrak’s new 2001 business plan, however, our work to date indicates that there still appear to be significant gaps in the business plan, particularly in the years 2002 and beyond. Nearly all of the undefined actions relate to expense savings and it will be critical for Amtrak to develop these actions as a means of curbing expense growth. The first step will be identifying concrete plans to fill the gap in the business plan, but definition is not enough. Amtrak must make these plans deliver.
Some of the planned initiatives will require upfront capital investments and may involve a significant ramp up period while employees learn new processes and old ones are phased out. Actions of the magnitude necessary to fill these gaps do not translate into revenues or cost savings overnight. Time is running short. Even under the best of circumstances there may not be enough time left for these actions to bear fruit in order for Amtrak to meet its operating self-sufficiency mandate by 2003, as directed by Congress.

• **Northeast Corridor Passenger Revenues.** We are concerned that Amtrak’s projections for Acela Express ridership assume a higher-than-likely diversion of passengers from air and automobile, and an underestimation of ridership on the slightly slower, but significantly less expensive Acela Regional service. However, if Amtrak were to make some fare and service adjustments – and Amtrak management has indicated a willingness to do so – revenues are likely to be closer to what Amtrak has projected.

In addition, Amtrak may stand to benefit from the growing congestion facing our Nation’s airways and highways. In 2000, more than 1 in 4 flights were delayed; canceled; or diverted, which affected approximately 163 million
passengers. Four of the top ten airports with chronically delayed and canceled flights are in the Northeast Corridor, and if relief is not found soon, Amtrak could provide a more palatable option for travelers. As part of our annual assessment of Amtrak’s financial performance, we evaluate Amtrak’s ridership and revenue projections in the Northeast Corridor. To do so, we evaluate the likely impacts of variations in fares, frequencies, and trip times on passenger transportation mode choices. Our work to date in the current assessment indicates that after longer flight times are factored in under the current congested flight travel scenario, Amtrak’s projections for passenger revenue may be conservative in 2003.

• **Mail and Express.** In its 2001 business plan, Amtrak is projecting Mail and Express service revenues of $402 million by 2003. We have disagreed with Amtrak on how quickly the Mail and Express service revenues are likely to ramp up. For instance, in 2000, Amtrak projected Mail and Express revenues of $176 million, but its actual Mail and Express revenues only totaled $122 million. We understand that Amtrak is in the process of revising its projections and we will look closely at these numbers during our ongoing assessment.

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6 Our definition of chronically delayed and/or canceled flights are regularly scheduled flights that arrive at least 30 minutes later than scheduled and/or were canceled at least 40 percent of the time during a single calendar month.
The bottom line is that Amtrak must reduce its cash losses by over $100 million each year for the next three years in order to reach operating self-sufficiency by 2003. In order to do so, Amtrak must identify concrete plans for filling all $737 million in undefined management actions, fully ramp-up high-speed rail in the Northeast Corridor and mail and express business, and aggressively pursue actions to curb expense growth.

**Third, Delays To Date In Bringing Acela Express On-Line And Their Related Revenue Impacts Should Not Have Long-Term Consequences, But Full Service Must Be Implemented Promptly.**

Amtrak expects to compensate for lost revenues in 2001 related to the delays in the full implementation of Acela Express through a combination of sale-leasebacks of equipment, cost-cutting measures, and short-term and other external financing.

Acela delays have affected Amtrak’s revenue projections and path toward self-sufficiency, delays of this nature are not uncommon in programs of this complexity. The new trainsets represent a significant adaptation of existing high-speed designs to meet more stringent safety requirements in the United States and to compensate for the unique track configurations on the Northeast Corridor. Problems identified in testing and design modifications are normal consequences of such new technology development programs.
The recently announced delays of approximately 3 additional months will mean that Amtrak’s revenues will be affected into 2002, rather than be limited to 2001 as we previously projected. These further delays will increase the burden Amtrak will face in closing the gaps in its business plan. High-speed rail is a cornerstone of Amtrak’s plans for self-sufficiency and the recently announced delays may have already jeopardized Amtrak’s ability to sustain its glidepath.

On December 11, 2000, Amtrak began operating the first Acela Express service in the Northeast Corridor. With a limited number of trainsets on hand, Amtrak’s service was limited to one round trip daily between Washington, D.C. and Boston. On May 17, Amtrak accepted its eighth high-speed trainset from the manufacturer and is currently operating five daily roundtrip Acela Express frequencies. Its current plans under the new delivery schedule are to have all 20 trainsets delivered, accepted, and in service by January 2002. This delay means that Amtrak will not realize a full year of Express revenues in 2002.

The popularity of Acela Express has been slow to ignite – load factors through April 2001 have averaged 47 percent on the Northend, and 29 percent on the Southend of the Corridor. These low load factors most likely reflect the initial lack of service options, not the quality of the service itself. Until March, the one Acela Express train left Washington at 5:00 a.m. and returned just before
midnight. These load factors are most likely not an accurate indicator of how well the service will be embraced once it is fully implemented.

The revenues Amtrak projects from the Acela program reflect a combination of revenues from the premium Express service as well as significant contributions from the much-improved Acela Regional Service. Amtrak is purchasing 15 new high-horsepower locomotives to operate the Regional service and had originally planned to take delivery of all equipment by March 2000. Amtrak now expects to take delivery of all 15 locomotives by late this summer. Revenues from Acela Regional are expected to be significant and while it is important that Acela Express ramp up as quickly as possible, Amtrak should make every effort to minimize additional delays in the Acela Regional implementation schedule.

**Fourth, Amtrak is Facing Severe Short-term Capital Funding Shortfalls.**

Last September, we reported that barring the availability of additional funding, Amtrak’s available capital funds in 2001 would fall $91 million short of meeting what we estimated to be $431 million in minimum needs. We have defined minimum needs as the level of annual spending necessary to allow Amtrak to be able to operate the railroad in a steady-state as the corporation strives to become operationally self-sufficient by 2003. It is important to note, however, that this minimum level of investment is inadequate to sustain the infrastructure and assets of the railroad over the long term beyond 2003. If Amtrak is not able to invest at a
significantly higher level, the reliability of Amtrak’s services will suffer and its operating costs will increase, as more frequent unscheduled repairs become necessary.

Facing this $91 million shortfall, we recommended that Amtrak reprogram any uncommitted funds from prior year capital budgets and direct those towards minimum needs projects in 2001. According to Amtrak’s 2001 capital plan, it reprogrammed $92 million from earlier years, which would have been sufficient to cover the shortfall. However, Amtrak has instead chosen to use much of the reprogrammed monies to help fund other non-minimum, higher-rate of return projects.

Examples of these projects include enhancements to Acela high-speed rail service in the Northeast ($30 million), new business development projects outside the Northeast Corridor ($17.4 million), and an expanded overhaul and refleeting program that was $58.5 million greater than our estimate of the investment needed for overhauls and refleeting in 2001.

Amtrak believes that if it does not make these investments, it will not be able to achieve and sustain operating self-sufficiency. Amtrak’s position is that these capital investments will provide the revenues and cost savings that it will need to close the gap in its business plan. While we agree these types of capital projects have merit, we are concerned, however, that these investments are being made at
the expense of operational reliability projects such as replacement of aging
traction and signaling systems which are at or near the end of their useful lives.
Amtrak’s planned 2001 spending on operational reliability projects of
$110 million is approximately $25 million less than we estimate is the minimum
annual investment Amtrak needs to make. Similarly, Amtrak’s planned spending
on life-safety needs of $21 million is $9 million below our minimum needs
estimate. Because these projects do not provide quick fixes or quick revenues,
they have repeatedly been relegated to the back burner.

This is a risky strategy for Amtrak. The majority of Amtrak’s operational
reliability needs are in the Northeast Corridor where Amtrak is depending on the
success of high-speed rail to not only significantly increase passenger revenues,
but to generate support for similar corridors throughout the nation. If Amtrak
continues to ignore these projects, in the very near term, electric traction and
signal failures will worsen, which will negatively affect reliability and on-time
performance, and subsequently undermine the perceived quality of the service.

The effects of underspending on minimum needs are already beginning to surface.
Some sections of the Northeast Corridor Southend electric traction system are over
60 years old, and the system is comprised of many components that are prone to
failure. Most often it is the overhead catenary wire that is unable to adjust to the
extreme temperature swings in the region and the wire expands or contracts creating stresses that can cause it to break as trains run under it. Another reliability problem on the Northeast Corridor is communications and signaling. The Southend contains 8 million feet of cable. Age, electrical faults and weather affect the ability of this cable to perform adequately. The following figure illustrates growth in minutes of delay related to electric traction and communications and signaling problems.

![Growth in Minutes of Delay on the Northeast Corridor, 1998-2000](image)

Lastly, Long-Term Capital Funding Sources Must Be Identified.

Even if Amtrak makes its operating self-sufficiency mandate in 2003, it will still continue to need significant, sustained, funding. Amtrak estimates that its total annual capital requirement is about $1.5 billion for addressing general capital needs, beginning to address a backlog of needs in the Northeast Corridor, and for
developing new high-speed corridors. Without a program for new corridor development, Amtrak estimates its annual need to be approximately $1 billion over the next 5 years and $750 million each year thereafter. Amtrak has prepared a 20-year comprehensive systemwide capital plan and we will be reviewing it closely as part of our ongoing assessment. We would like to briefly discuss a few of the many options for securing capital funding of this magnitude.

- **General Capital Appropriations.** Amtrak’s needs have traditionally been funded through an annual appropriations process, although Congress has periodically provided separate capital grants including the $2.2 billion tax rebate authorized under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Annual appropriations could continue to be the primary source of capital funds, but they would need to be substantially higher than recent years’ appropriations if Amtrak is to be able to adequately invest in its capital needs.

- **Designated or Earmarked Appropriations.** Amtrak has significant needs in the Northeast Corridor that it has had difficulty addressing because of its large cash losses and the competing interest of investing in higher rate-of-return projects that support its efforts to achieve operating self-sufficiency. Consequently, Amtrak has not invested adequately in projects that sustain the integrity of the system, including life-safety needs.

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Footnote:

7 In addition, Amtrak estimates that it will need approximately $200 million each year to meet its excess railroad retirement requirements.
Amtrak’s most pressing life-safety needs include the 15 miles of tunnels leading into Penn-Station New York where nearly $900 million is needed to bring them up to par with modern safety standards, including the replacement of narrow, winding, spiral staircases, installation of modern ventilation fans, and the rehabilitation of benchwalls. In 1998, Amtrak warned Congress that unless improvements were made rapidly, the age and condition of the tunnels, coupled with the projected growth in traffic, would raise the potential for a serious and consequential accident.

Last fall, Amtrak, the Long Island Rail Road, and New Jersey Transit developed an accelerated schedule that would complete all work by 2010, and the most critical projects by 2005. But accelerating the schedule can only be accomplished if adequate funding is made available and the three railroads agree on an equitable cost-sharing arrangement. An annual average investment of $90 million (in 2002 dollars) would be required to adhere to the accelerated 2010 schedule.

One option for funding could be an earmarked 2002 appropriation equal to Amtrak’s share of total project costs that would be available until expended (the last portion in 2010, or sooner if possible). The other users of the tunnels would need to find matches at the State or local level. The benefit of a full appropriation at the start – vs. annual appropriations – is the assurance of a steady stream of funds that will be available when needed to
cover Amtrak’s share of the costs. Because of the multi-year nature of many of the projects, uncertain or uneven levels of funding in the past has made it difficult to schedule project starts and coordinate matching funds. By appropriating the full amount up front and removing any uncertainty over funding, the safety projects should be able to proceed as quickly as operationally feasible.

- **Proceeds from Amtrak-issued Bonds.** Another funding option is an instrument similar to the High-Speed Rail Investment Act (HSRIA), which was introduced in the last Congress, but was not enacted. The current version introduced in the Senate (S. 250) would make $12 billion available over 10 years through the sale of bonds for development of high-speed corridors around the country. It will be important that any proposed bill provide for sufficient Federal oversight of Amtrak’s spending of the bond proceeds.

On a final note, even if Amtrak succeeds in reaching operating self-sufficiency, it will continue to need significant and sustained capital funding beyond 2003. In the foreseeable future, we see no set of circumstances where passenger and other revenues will be sufficient to fund the level of capital investment necessary to keep the railroad operating on a national level in good condition. Even with adequate short-term funding, Amtrak may not be able to achieve operating self-
sufficiency by its mandated deadline, but without a significant, long-term source of capital funding, failure will be a certainty.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions.