



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

**FAA Has Not Fully Addressed Safety
Concerns Regarding the American
Airlines Flight Test Program**

FAA

Report No. AV2018060

July 10, 2018





FAA Has Not Fully Addressed Safety Concerns Regarding the American Airlines Flight Test Program

Self-initiated

Federal Aviation Administration | AV2018060 | July 10, 2018

What We Looked At

Federal regulations require U.S. air carriers to verify the airworthiness of aircraft following major repairs or maintenance. To perform these maintenance checks, American Airlines (AA), established a flight test program. In February 2017, Allied Pilots Association (APA)—which represents AA’s pilots—contacted us about multiple safety issues at the AA flight test program, including the use of unqualified pilots. APA stated that concerns placed in an earlier letter to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had remained “largely unaddressed for over 18 months.” We initiated an audit to assess the effectiveness of FAA’s actions in response to safety concerns about the AA flight test program. Specifically, we examined how (1) FAA’s oversight office for American Airlines addressed concerns about the flight test program and (2) the Agency processed and responded to a letter to the Federal Aviation Administrator questioning the integrity of FAA’s oversight of the flight test program.

What We Found

FAA’s oversight office for American Airlines lacked objectivity in its review. While FAA requires inspectors to provide impartial treatment, the inspector in this case seems to have been affected by his relationship with AA personnel and the 28 years he spent working with the carrier. While the Agency has a tool for assessing its relationships with carriers, the tool did not account for these risk factors. In addition, the Agency used a “best guess” method to determine who should respond to APA’s written allegations, and ultimately routed the letter back to the target of the complaint for response. Due to a lack of oversight guidance, FAA also provided varying responses to APA and OIG regarding the requirements for the flight test program. As a result, APA received neither a comprehensive nor an accurate response to its concerns.

Our Recommendations

FAA concurred with our seven recommendations to improve its oversight of the flight test program, as well as its ability to respond to safety concerns.

Contents

Memorandum	1
Results in Brief	3
Background	4
FAA’s Local Oversight Office Did Not Address Concerns About the AA Flight Test Program	5
Issues Brought to the Federal Aviation Administrator’s Attention Remain Unresolved	8
Conclusion	10
Recommendations	10
Agency Comments and OIG Response	11
Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology	12
Exhibit B. Organizations Visited or Contacted	13
Exhibit C. List of Acronyms	14
Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report	15
Appendix. Agency Comments	16



Memorandum

Date: July 10, 2018

Subject: FAA Has Not Fully Addressed Safety Concerns Regarding the American Airlines Flight Test Program | Report No. AV2018060

From: Matthew E. Hampton
Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits 

To: Federal Aviation Administrator

Federal regulations require U.S. air carriers to verify the airworthiness of aircraft following major repairs or maintenance.¹ To accomplish this, American Airlines (AA), established a flight test program to perform these maintenance checks. In February 2017, the Allied Pilots Association (APA)—which represents AA’s pilots—contacted the Office of Inspector General (OIG), concerned about multiple safety issues pertaining to the flight test program, including AA’s use of unqualified pilots and a culture of suppressing safety complaints. The association previously contacted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) but stated its concerns had remained “largely unaddressed for over 18 months.” We obtained sufficient evidence during a preliminary meeting with APA and from our review of documentation to initiate an audit to examine these concerns in greater detail.

Our objective was to assess the effectiveness of FAA’s actions in response to safety concerns about the AA flight test program. Specifically, we examined how (1) FAA’s Certificate Management Office (referred to as the oversight office in this report) addressed concerns about the flight test program and (2) the Agency processed and responded to a letter to the Federal Aviation Administrator questioning the integrity of FAA’s oversight of the flight test program.

We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Exhibit A details our scope and methodology. Exhibit B lists the entities we visited or contacted.

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of Department of Transportation representatives during this audit. If you have any questions concerning this

¹ Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 91.407(b).

report, please call me at (202) 366-0500, or Tina Nysted, Program Director, at (404) 562-3770.

cc: The Secretary
DOT Audit Liaison, M-1
FAA Audit Liaison, AAE-100

Results in Brief

FAA's local oversight office did not address concerns about the AA Flight Test Program.

FAA's oversight office for American Airlines lacked objectivity in its review and did not respond to concerns about unqualified pilots and unsafe conditions during maintenance verification flights. FAA, in line with Governmentwide standards, requires inspectors to provide impartial treatment and avoid actions that may create an appearance of preferential treatment. However, the inspector's oversight role in this case appears to have been affected by his relationship with the head of the AA flight test program and the length of time—28 years—he performed oversight of American Airlines. This potential loss of impartiality is particularly troubling considering the scope of his responsibilities, including oversight of voluntary safety programs, pilot training, and safety management systems. Additionally, as the only inspector overseeing the flight test program, he became a single point of failure for FAA. A new supervisor identified possible objectivity issues and recommended temporarily reassigning the inspector. However, Agency officials did not consider the request a priority and took nearly 4 months to reassign the individual. Additionally, FAA developed an evaluation tool that pulls data from multiple sources to assess its collaborative relationships with air carriers. However, that tool does not account for risk factors such as non-routine operations (e.g., flight test) or the length of time inspectors have been assigned to a carrier. Furthermore, the FAA oversight office lacks controls to ensure complaints are properly addressed. Neither the inspector nor office managers complied with FAA's requirements for processing complaints or provided a response to APA directly addressing the underlying issues that prompted the complaints. As a result, APA elevated its concerns to the Federal Aviation Administrator.

Issues brought to the Federal Aviation Administrator's attention remain unresolved.

According to APA, the airline's managers and an FAA inspector warned AA's pilots that complaints could result in penalties and perhaps the end of the program. FAA, however, did not view these comments as a safety concern or consult the Agency's Office of Audit and Evaluation group, which was specifically established to address complaints. Instead, the Agency used a "best guess" method, which lacked criteria for identifying safety issues, to determine who should respond to APA's written allegations. The letter was routed through FAA Headquarters, then ultimately back to the target of the complaint, the FAA oversight office. Significantly, no one at FAA realized the Agency had not addressed APA's allegation that the oversight office was working with airline officials to suppress pilot safety concerns. In addition, representatives in the

oversight office asked the carrier to respond to many of APA's concerns and ultimately included those responses in the Agency's letter signed by the Administrator.

FAA also provided varying responses to APA and OIG regarding the requirements for the flight test program—such as whether or not the carrier must comply with established programs—due to a lack of oversight guidance. As a result, APA did not receive a comprehensive or accurate response. After we discussed our findings with FAA officials, the Agency completed an independent assessment of the program in October 2017 that verified many of APA's concerns. However, FAA's oversight office has not provided an updated response to APA or worked with the Agency's policy officials to clarify oversight responsibilities and develop corrective actions.

We made seven recommendations to help FAA improve its oversight of and address safety concerns about the flight test program.

Background

The local FAA oversight office for American Airlines, based in Irving, TX, is responsible for overseeing AA's maintenance programs and flight operations, including the flight test program. Approximately 100 inspectors and managers within this office are responsible for certificating, surveilling, and inspecting the airline, which performs nearly 2.5 million domestic and international flights each year using more than 1,000 aircraft and 12 different fleet types.

Air carriers typically fly aircraft to test performance after major repairs or maintenance have been completed. While these flights are not performed with passengers or cargo onboard, it is important that carriers implement procedures to ensure the flights are operated safely. On December 22, 1996, three crewmembers and three technicians were killed when an Airborne Express DC-8 crashed during such a flight, which aimed to verify that recent maintenance and modifications had not changed how the aircraft operated. Following its investigation of the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board made a series of recommendations to FAA, including to establish guidance for air carriers performing non-routine operations, such as evaluation flights, and conduct appropriate surveillance of these programs.

As a result, FAA issued its Non-Routine Flight Operations (NRFO) guidance in August 2002 (updated May 2008), which recommended that carriers update manuals and develop training, reviewed and accepted by FAA, so that each NRFO is conducted with procedures consistent with safe flight. While these actions are not required, American Airlines used the recommendations to develop its flight

test program and train approximately 20 pilots to perform certain NRFO, such as maintenance verification flights and flying damaged aircraft to a repair facility.

FAA's Local Oversight Office Did Not Address Concerns About the AA Flight Test Program

FAA staff overseeing American Airlines lacked objectivity and did not follow the Agency's guidance for addressing complaints when they received APA's letter. Specifically, the inspector, who had developed a personal relationship with the head of the AA flight test program, did not properly investigate safety complaints.

FAA's Review of Complaints About the Flight Test Program Lacked Objectivity

The FAA inspector assigned to investigate the complaint had conversations with the head of the AA flight test program about "problem pilots," a reference to pilots who filed complaints. Rather than objectively review the basis for their complaints, as called for in FAA guidance, the inspector requested and received information from American Airlines that could have been used to discredit the pilots who voiced concerns. For example, the AA manager said of one of the pilots, "he seems more interested in litigating his way through life at AA versus doing work."

Governmentwide and FAA's ethical standards² require inspectors to act impartially and to avoid the appearance of preferential treatment when they perform their official duties. However, the inspector in this case had developed a personal relationship with the head of the AA flight test program, which created the appearance of diminished impartiality. For example, he made plans, using his Government-issued computer and email account, to travel abroad with the head of the program and introduce him to the inspector's family. The potential impact of the inspector's apparent lack of impartiality was compounded by the large scope of air carrier programs for which he was responsible. Managers at the FAA oversight office did not recognize the extent of his relationship with a senior airline employee or its potential impact on his oversight activities.

² 5 CFR § 2635.101, "Basic obligation of public service." *Ethical Conduct and Financial Disclosure* (FAA Order 3750.7A).

When we interviewed the inspector about the flight test program, he displayed little knowledge of it beyond describing how great it was. Instead, he stated that a few pilots had been causing problems for 15 years and advised us to “talk to the experts.” Then, without our knowledge, he set up a meeting with us and airline officials—whom he called the “kings of the airline.” Furthermore, during an interview about potential inspector impartiality, an FAA flight operations frontline manager referred to the AA flight test manager as “perfect” and someone who “could do no wrong,” and to the airline as “golden.” These comments raise concerns about the lack of objectivity at this FAA office.

In September 2016, a new supervisor was assigned to the office and determined that the inspector was not performing his oversight functions properly and objectively. The inspector had worked there for 28 years and was involved in many areas beyond the flight test program. For example, he was involved in hotline complaints, multiple AA voluntary safety programs, and oversight of the carrier’s safety management system, which is used to identify and mitigate safety risks across the airline. However, as the only inspector overseeing the flight test program, he became a single point of failure for FAA. The supervisor reassigned oversight of two programs to other staff, but did not adjust the inspector’s role in the carrier’s safety programs or the flight test group. In March 2017, the supervisor raised concerns about the inspector’s role and possible lack of objectivity with local and regional office managers. However, the regional office did not see the issue as a priority and took nearly 4 months to reassign the inspector.

The supervisor’s concerns regarding diminished objectivity and the lack of support from the regional office are similar to those we highlighted in our 2008 review of FAA’s oversight office for Southwest Airlines.³ In response to our recommendation, FAA developed a tool⁴ to assess collaborative relationships between its oversight offices and assigned carriers; it utilizes data from multiple Agency sources to identify anomalies in inspector performance. However, the tool does not incorporate risk factors such as non-routine operations (e.g., maintenance verification flights) or the length of time an inspector has been assigned to a carrier—key factors in this review. As a result, FAA cannot be certain of the tool’s ability to detect issues at other oversight offices.

FAA emphasizes the importance of a strong safety culture within the Agency and the industry. Guidance for FAA’s Safety Management System—one of the programs the inspector was responsible for overseeing—identifies some

³ *Review of FAA’s Safety Oversight of Airlines and Use of Regulatory Partnership Programs* (OIG Report No. AV-2008-057), June 30, 2008. OIG reports are available on our website: <https://www.oig.dot.gov/>.

⁴ Certificate Management Data Evaluation Process (CMDEP).

characteristics of a positive safety culture as valuing individuals' opinions, encouraging personnel to identify safety threats, providing a non-punitive environment for reporting safety concerns, and displaying a willingness to recognize when basic assumptions should be challenged and changes are warranted. Because management did not recognize or mitigate threats to diminished staff objectivity, the FAA oversight office's ability to promote safety and adequately respond to complaints was compromised.

FAA Staff Did Not Follow Agency Guidance When Addressing Complaints About the Flight Test Program

FAA's oversight office staff did not address APA's concerns⁵ about unqualified pilots and unsafe conditions during maintenance verification flights. National and local FAA guidance⁶ provide instructions and timeframes for processing complaints. In addition, the oversight office's complaint coordinator sent numerous emails reminding staff about specific requirements for handling complaints. However, the office lacked an effective control to ensure complainants were contacted, investigations were documented, and complaints were resolved. As a result, FAA did not respond to APA's questions about how pilots are trained to conduct flight tests and whether maintenance verification flights can be performed on damaged aircraft.

The oversight office developed local guidance stating that an inspector should contact the complainant to acknowledge receipt and obtain any additional information. Instead of contacting APA, the inspector provided airline management officials with information about the complaint and the individual who had signed it. Less than a month after the inspector notified the airline, AA management held a meeting with all flight test pilots to address the "level of noise." Pilots were told they "must stay off the radar," which APA interpreted as meaning the flight test program would be shut down if the complaints continued. Prior to the meeting, the inspector notified airline management via email that FAA's position was that the flight test program operated safely and professionally, and asked them to "lead me in the right direction." Furthermore, the local guidance gives the assigned FAA inspector 2 days to contact the complainant. In this case, however, the inspector waited more than 2 months and then asked the airline to set up a meeting for him and the complainant—a

⁵ APA's specific complaints/concerns were extremely technical in nature; as such, we have summarized them here.

⁶ *Flight Standards Information Management System* (FAA Order 8900.1), volume 7, chapter 5, section 1. *Aviation Safety Quality Management System* (AFS-SW-21-403-02), "Complaints."

process typically used for pilots under FAA investigation. Although APA asked the inspector multiple times to clarify the purpose of the meeting and state whether the individual was under investigation, the inspector did not respond, and the meeting never occurred.

In addition, the inspector did not document any of the work he performed to investigate the APA complaint. The guidance requires inspectors to document complaint-related work in FAA's surveillance tracking system. Instead, when FAA's new assistant manager for the oversight office asked for an update, the inspector sent an email stating he had traveled to the flight test center to investigate the concerns. According to travel records, he only visited the flight test center once for approximately 4 hours. The inspector reported that during this time he attended a meeting regarding flight test program safety reports, and reviewed the carrier's pilot training program and the specific qualifications maintained in at least three different systems for the flight test pilots. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to adequately perform these tasks in a 4-hour period.

Finally, FAA Order 8900.1 states that Flight Standards personnel should attempt to provide a final written response within 10 business days from the time of receipt. The Agency received APA's complaint in December 2015. However, the inspector did not review any documentation until April 2016, and the FAA oversight office did not respond to the complaint. Due to the lack of a response, in July 2016, APA wrote to the Federal Aviation Administrator about the Agency's oversight of the AA flight test program.

Issues Brought to the Federal Aviation Administrator's Attention Remain Unresolved

FAA missed key safety concerns APA raised in its letter to the Administrator and did not consult the Audit and Evaluation group about the Agency's response. Instead, the letter was routed to several offices before it was returned to the FAA oversight office—the specific target of the complaint.

While APA stated that "both the CMO [Certificate Management Office] and American Airlines managers warned that additional 'complaints' and 'noise' from ASAP [Aviation Safety Action Program] reports would possibly result in penalties ... up to and including abandonment of the program," FAA Flight Standards managers at the FAA oversight office and Headquarters did not recognize this as a safety concern. When we discussed the allegation with FAA's Audit and Evaluation group, which handles complaints and internal audits, they immediately identified these concerns as a significant threat to safety. However, that group was not consulted about the response to the APA letter because FAA distributes

correspondence via a “best guess” method, which does not include criteria for identifying safety issues.

In the “best guess” method, letters are assigned to the Agency’s subject matter experts, who review them and determine whether or not to respond. FAA officials defended this method by stating the experts are in the best position to evaluate correspondence. In this instance, APA’s letter was routed to the Aviation Safety Division, then to Flight Standards, and ultimately back to the oversight office that was the target of the complaint. In addition, representatives in the oversight office asked the carrier to respond to many of APA’s concerns and ultimately included those responses in the Agency’s letter signed by the Administrator.

According to the FAA oversight office, the flight test program was “supplemental,” and therefore the carrier did not have to follow written requirements even though FAA had formally accepted them. However, both APA and OIG received conflicting responses about the requirements from FAA. For example, an FAA maintenance policy official told us that the carrier was expected to comply with flight test policies and procedures because they supported the carrier’s FAA-authorized maintenance program. We requested clarification from the Agency’s Air Carrier Operations Branch but found that FAA does not have guidance on how to oversee these types of operations and programs. In addition, the FAA oversight office for American Airlines did not work with policy officials to verify the Agency’s position.

Furthermore, during the complaint review process, no one at FAA realized that the allegation about the oversight office had not been addressed. After we discussed our concerns with FAA, the Agency used staff from the United Airlines oversight office to conduct a technical assessment of the flight test program, but did not review the objectivity of staff at the oversight office for American Airlines. The October 2017 assessment verified many of our and APA’s technical concerns, including whether properly qualified pilots were performing maintenance verification flights and whether those flights can be performed on aircraft that have not been fully repaired. The FAA operations supervisor for American Airlines formally presented the findings to the carrier in December 2017, and established a safety analysis team with airline officials to resolve the issues. Furthermore, during our audit, the inspector at the center of the complaint retired, and the carrier began making changes to the flight test program. However, FAA has not provided an updated response to the complainant, and oversight office staff have not worked with FAA policy officials to clarify responsibilities and develop corrective actions. As a result, APA’s safety concerns have yet to be fully addressed.

Conclusion

Concerns about the impact of FAA inspector relationships with the airlines they oversee have been an issue since our 2008 review of the Agency's oversight office for Southwest Airlines. Our report spurred FAA to take a number of actions, including developing a tool that assesses its relationship with air carriers. However, the tool does not incorporate sufficient risk factors to identify diminished inspector impartiality. Additionally, weaknesses in FAA's process for identifying and handling safety complaints resulted in multiple missed opportunities to mitigate risks identified by an industry stakeholder. As a result, FAA is not in a position to respond to safety complaints about the flight test program and cannot be assured that its safety oversight is sufficient or comprehensive.

Recommendations

To improve FAA's oversight of the American Airlines flight test program as well as its ability to respond to safety concerns, we recommend that the Federal Aviation Administrator:

1. Conduct an independent review of FAA's oversight of American Airlines' flight operations to determine whether controls are in place and effective in preventing single points of failure; develop and implement corrective actions, if necessary.
2. Modify the existing tool used to evaluate the objectivity of inspectors to incorporate risk factors such as non-routine operations and the length of time inspectors oversee the same air carrier.
3. Develop and implement controls requiring oversight office staff to resolve complaints and follow key policy requirements such as directly contacting complainants and documenting investigations.
4. Establish and implement criteria for evaluating correspondence to ensure safety complaints are routed to FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation.
5. Develop and implement inspector guidance on FAA's oversight requirements for flight test operations.
6. Provide the Allied Pilots Association with a revised response to its complaint based on results from the October 2017 independent assessment of the American Airlines flight test program.

7. Develop and implement a corrective action plan to address the recommendations made by the October 2017 independent assessment of the American Airlines flight test program.

Agency Comments and OIG Response

We provided FAA with our draft report on May 21, 2018, and received its formal response on June 20, 2018, which is included as an appendix to this report. FAA concurred with all seven of our recommendations and provided planned implementation dates for each. We consider these recommendations resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

Actions Required

We consider recommendations 1–7 resolved but open pending completion of planned actions.

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit between April 2017 and May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We met with APA officials to better understand their concerns and the potential safety impacts. Then, to assess how APA's concerns about the AA flight test program were addressed, we met with local, regional, and national FAA Flight Standards officials responsible for oversight of AA and policies relevant to the complaint. We reviewed surveillance and travel records, as well as emails from the inspector directly responsible for overseeing the program. We also interviewed AA personnel and reviewed its program documentation. To assess how the Agency processed and responded to APA's letter to the Federal Aviation Administrator, we reviewed tracking logs associated with the complaint and interviewed FAA officials responsible for processing correspondence within Flight Standards, Aviation Safety, and the Office of the Administrator. We also met with officials in FAA's Office of Audit and Evaluation, which is responsible for addressing complaints.

Exhibit B. Organizations Visited or Contacted

FAA Facilities

Headquarters

Office of the Administrator
Aviation Safety
Flight Standards Service
Office of Audit and Evaluation
Air Carrier Maintenance Branch
Air Carrier Operations Branch
Evaluations Program Branch
Policy Integration Branch

Field Offices

Southwest Region
American Airlines Certificate Management Office
United Airlines Certificate Management Office

Other Organizations

American Airlines, Fort Worth, TX
Allied Pilots Association, Fort Worth, TX

Exhibit C. List of Acronyms

AA	American Airlines
APA	Allied Pilots Association
ASAP	Aviation Safety Action Program
CMO	Certificate Management Office
DOT	Department of Transportation
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
NRFO	Non-Routine Flight Operations
OIG	Office of Inspector General

Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report

TINA NYSTED

PROGRAM DIRECTOR

MARSHALL ANDERSON

PROJECT MANAGER

ANNE LONGTIN

SENIOR ANALYST

CURT BOETTCHER

SENIOR ANALYST

TIM MCDOUGALL

SENIOR AUDITOR

JANE LUSAKA

WRITER-EDITOR

SETH KAUFMAN

SENIOR COUNSEL

Appendix. Agency Comments



Federal Aviation Administration

Memorandum

Date: June 20, 2018

To: Matthew E. Hampton, Assistant Inspector General for Aviation Audits

From: H. Clayton Foushee, Director, Office of Audit and Evaluation, AAE-1 

Subject: Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Response to Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report: Safety Concerns Regarding the American Airlines Flight Test Program

The FAA has initiated several safety enhancements to the American Airlines Flight Test Operations Program. The use of Risk-Based Decision Making and Compliance Oversight principles have facilitated a collaborative approach to resolving the issues identified in the report. New initiatives include the establishment of a Safety Analysis Team comprised of all relevant stakeholders, and the development of a new Risk Management Process. American Airlines has been fully cooperative in communicating information about identified hazards to the Agency, and all correctives actions are tracked in the carrier's Safety Management System.

The FAA offers the following comments to the OIG's findings:

- The draft report states that it took four months from the time a supervisor raised concerns about the Aviation Safety Inspector's (ASI) role and lack of objectivity until the regional office reassigned him. The report further states that the regional office did not see the issue as a priority. However, the FAA supports a robust ethics program that focuses on identifying conflicts of interest, training and advising on conflicts, and undertaking appropriate enforcement action. Once the issues were brought to the FAA's attention, it began the necessary review process to determine the appropriate action. This ultimately resulted in a change to the ASI's responsibilities along with the initiation of formal action once the allegations were substantiated.
- The FAA did complete an independent assessment of the American Airlines Flight Test Operations Program. That assessment identified several compliance issues and other hazards. The Allied Pilots Association is participating in the resulting Safety Analysis Team, which is working to evaluate and mitigate these issues.

We concur with the recommendations, as written. We plan to implement recommendations 2, 6 and 7 by October 31 2018, recommendations 1, 3 and 4 by March 31, 2019, and recommendation 5 by June 30, 2019.

We appreciate this opportunity to respond to the OIG draft report. Please contact H. Clayton Foushee at (202) 267-9000 if you have any questions or require additional information about these comments.

U.S. DOT IG Fraud & Safety Hotline

hotline@oig.dot.gov | (800) 424-9071

<https://www.oig.dot.gov/hotline>

Our Mission

OIG conducts audits and investigations on behalf of the American public to improve the performance and integrity of DOT's programs to ensure a safe, efficient, and effective national transportation system.

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. Department of Transportation
1200 New Jersey Ave SE
Washington, DC 20590



www.oig.dot.gov