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Audit Reports


Weaknesses in FAA’s Supplemental Passenger Restraint System Authorization Process Hinder Improvements to Open-Door Helicopter Operations

Requested By
Requested by Senators Charles Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand
Project ID
File Attachment
What We Looked At
On March 11, 2018, a fatal Liberty Helicopters crash in New York, NY took the lives of five passengers who were trapped in their supplemental passenger restraints when the open-door helicopter partially submerged in the East River. In response, Senators Charles Schumer and Kirsten Gillibrand requested that we—in consultation with NTSB—review FAA’s oversight of helicopter air tours and how FAA approved the supplemental restraint system used during the tragic crash. Our objectives were to assess FAA’s processes for (1) review and approval of supplemental restraints for open-door helicopter operations and (2) oversight of company use of supplemental restraints.
What We Found
FAA did not maintain effective and consistent oversight of open-door helicopter operations to maintain the safety of air tour passengers. FAA lacks an effective process to review, authorize, and ensure the safe use of supplemental restraints for open-door helicopter operations; and FAA inspectors lack sufficient guidance to oversee operator use of supplemental passenger restraints. FAA has made efforts to issue guidance to achieve prompt operator compliance and eliminate safety risks by developing a special authorization for supplemental passenger restraint systems. However, that authorization process is still evolving and important risk information has been overlooked. Also, FAA does not currently provide the guidance inspectors need to ensure operators are using and maintaining the supplemental restraints the Agency has authorized. Overall, we found that FAA has the opportunity to improve its authorization process and oversight regarding supplemental passenger restraint use and increase the safety of helicopter air tour passengers.
FAA concurred with four of our five recommendations to improve the effectiveness of its supplemental passenger restraint authorization process, providing appropriate actions and completion dates. FAA partially concurred with recommendation 3 and did not provide an alternative action or completion date. We ask the Agency to reconsider its response to this recommendation and provide us with an alternative action and anticipated completion date.


No. 1 to FAA
Issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and a final rule, if found to be in the public interest, that address operations using supplemental passenger restraint systems.
Closed on
No. 2 to FAA
Require all supplemental passenger restraint system applications to be reviewed using a standardized evaluation checklist that defines which information must be included on the request form for authorization.   
No. 3 to FAA
Define minimum certification standards that meet aviation-specific load factors for supplemental passenger restraint systems.
No. 4 to FAA
Revise the supplemental passenger restraint system authorization procedures so applications are routed through local oversight offices to notify inspectors which operators are requesting and subsequently authorized for supplemental restraint use.
No. 5 to FAA
Develop and incorporate supplemental passenger restraint inspection criteria—such as frequency of inspections, review of harness authorization documentation, and maintenance of harnesses into inspector guidance for both Part 135 and Part 91 surveillance.