http://www.oig.dot.gov/rss.jsp?subject=17 The 10 most recent releases on the U.S. DoT OIG web site related to Air Traffic Control Operations en-US webmaster@oig.dot.gov (OIG Webmaster) http://www.oig.dot.gov/images/dot.gif http://www.oig.dot.gov/rss.jsp?subject=17 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2566 On November 2, we issued our final report on FAAs Progress in Enhancing Air Traffic Control Systems Security. The audit objectives were to determine FAAs progress in correcting security weaknesses previously identified in the air traffic control (ATC) system by assessing (1) the status of Business Continuity Plan implementation and (2) the enhanced methodology used in the certification and accreditation of air traffic control systems security at operational sites. The FAA made good progress in preparing the Technical Center to serve as the recovery site; yet several unresolved technical challenges, staffing issues, and funding requirements could delay recovery site readiness. Further, while FAA has enhanced the process of reviewing ATC systems security, the reviews were not properly carried out to ensure security protection of operational ATC systems. Mon, 02 Nov 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2566 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2557 On October 28, 2009, the Inspector General testified before the House Subcommittee on Aviation regarding FAA actions required to address the recommendations of a joint Government/Industry task force report for achieving midterm goals for the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen).The Inspector General noted that NextGen is a high risk effort and a top management challenge for the Department and FAA. A number of operational and management decisions must be addressed to successfully transition to NextGen and address the task forces recommendations. These include maximizing the benefits of performance based navigation initiatives and managing NextGen efforts as integrated portfolios of investments. The Inspector General noted that the findings of the task force are consistent with our work but also identified several new areas for FAAs attention.To move beyond endorsing the task forces recommendations, the Inspector General stated that FAA must set realistic expectations for NextGen. Specifically, FAA must: (1) develop plans to initiate action and establish a 5year funding profile for the NextGen midterm, (2) establish metrics for assessing and measuring progress, and (3) develop and implement a strategy for linking near and midterm efforts with the Agencys longterm plans for transforming the National Airspace System. Wed, 28 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2557 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2564 At the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security, we will review the five Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) programs identified as key to changing how air traffic is managed. Our audit objectives are to (1) review the status of the programs cost, schedule, and performance baselines; (2) determine FAAs progress in implementing these programs and identify risk to achieving NextGen goals. Tue, 27 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2564 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2556 On October 21, 2009, we issued our report on FAAs actions to implement 77 initiatives of the New York Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC). We conducted this audit at the request of the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Aviation, who expressed the Subcommittees concern about the effectiveness of delayreduction efforts at the New York airports. Our audit objective was to examine FAAs progress in implementing the 77 ARC initiatives. We found that, while FAA reported many of these initiatives as complete, most are not being used or are used infrequently due to limited tactical need, operational and technical problems, unfinished testing, and controller/airline issues. Other initiatives face challenges, such as special equipment and training requirements or litigation, or are part of nationwide FAA programs that will not be completed until 2012 or later. While FAA has begun addressing these issues, much work remains to be done. We recommended that FAA (1) assess completed and remaining initiatives to determine whether they are providing benefits or should be discontinued or recategorized, (2) resolve technical, operational, and controller/airline issues affecting many of the initiatives reported as completed, and (3) fully operationalize the Integration Offices NY Area Delay Reduction Plan and Schedule. FAA generally concurred with our recommendations. Wed, 21 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2556 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2555 At the request of the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Aviation, we will review the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAAs) safety certification process for the air traffic control system and services related to the Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADSB) system. Our audit objectives are to examine FAAs revised certification procedures, as applied to ADSB, to: 1) determine the impact on FAAs statutory responsibility to maintain the safety and integrity of air traffic control systems; and 2) identify the challenges and risks associated with the private sector operating and maintaining key air traffic control systems. Wed, 21 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2555 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2498 On June 29, 2009, we issued our report on fatigue factors that could impact air traffic controllers. We conducted this audit at three critical Chicago air traffic control facilities at the request of Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois. These 3 facilities are among the top 10 busiest in the United States, and Senator Durbin expressed concerns that staffing shortfalls, longer hours on the job, and a growing shortage of certified controllers may be causing controller fatigue. Accordingly, our audit objectives were to (1) identify and evaluate key factors that could cause controller fatigue at Chicago OHare International Airport Air Traffic Control Tower, Chicago Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility, and Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and (2) identify what measures FAA has taken to mitigate potential controller fatigue at these locations. We identified a number of factors at these three facilities that could create potential fatigue conditions for controllers. These include minimal hours between shifts; scheduled overtime; and onthejob training, which requires a high level of concentration and focus from the instructing controller. Facility personnel also identified other factors that could cause fatigue, including inadequate staffing levels, increased work load (i.e., traffic volume and complexity), and extended time on position or lack of position rotation.Although the National Transportation Safety Board has identified controller fatigue as a potential contributing factor in several operational errors, FAA does not consistently address human factors issues, such as fatigue and situational awareness, during its operational error investigation processes. However, FAA has begun actions at the national level to address NTSB recommendations regarding fatigue, such as amending FAA Order 7210.3 to increase the time available to controllers for rest between shifts. FAA has also developed a computerbased training module on the effects of fatigue on controller performance. At the time of our review, however, none of these actions had been implemented at the three facilities. While our review focused on only the three Chicago facilities, it is likely that the fatigue factors that we identified exist at other large air traffic control facilities throughout the Nation. Our recommendations focus on actions FAA needs to take at the national level to mitigate potential fatigue factors and enhance the level of safety of the National Airspace System. FAA generally concurred with our recommendations. Mon, 29 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2498 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2484 On June 11, 2009, the Inspector General testified before the House Subcommittee on Aviation regarding regional air carriers, pilot workforce issues, and concerns with the Federal Aviation Adminstrations (FAA) oversight of the aviation industry. Last months National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hearing after the crash of Colgan flight 3407 highlighted the need to closely examine regulations governing pilot training and rest requirements and the oversight necessary to ensure their compliance. This is a particular concern at regional carriers, which constitute an increasing proportion of U.S. operations. The Inspector General noted several issues with regional and mainline carriers that could impact safety, such as identified differences in operating environments and potential differences in pilots flight experience, training programs, fatigue levels, and compensation. Despite these differences, FAA maintains it has one level of safety for all types of air carrier operations. The Inspector General stated that while FAA has improved some aspects of its safety oversight, there are still weaknesses in its oversight and inconsistencies in how its rules and regulations are enforced. Given the concerns with regional carriers noted by the NTSB and the vulnerabilities previously identified with FAAs safety oversight, the Subcommittee requested that the Office of Inspector General review aspects of pilot training and rest requirements. The Inspector General stated that his office recently started this review, which focuses on FAA oversight of commuter and regional pilot training, the number of training hours needed before a pilot can assume pilotincommand responsibilities, and how U.S. airlines update pilots on the latest technologies on the aircraft they operate. The review will also examine the information pilots are required to provide airlines and whether it is sufficient to verify pilot employment and training. Thu, 11 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2484 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2485 On June 10, 2009, the Inspector General testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security regarding the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) role in the oversight of air carriers. The Inspector General noted that while FAA has made progress toward improving aspects of its safety oversight, there are still vulnerabilities that must be addressed, especially in five critical areas: riskbased inspections, repair stations, aging aircraft, disclosures of safety violations made through the Aviation Safety Action Program, and internal reviews of whistleblower complaints.The Inspector General also noted operational differences between regional and mainline carriers that could impact safety and discussed his offices recently initiated review in this area. This review was requested by the Subcommittee as a result of a National Transportation Safety Board hearing last month that highlighted pilot training and fatigue issues following the crash of Colgan flight 3407. The Office of Inspector Generals review will focus on (1) aspects of pilot training, such as FAAs standards for and oversight of certification of commercial pilot training, (2) FAA regulations and airline policies regarding crew rest requirements, and (3) possible correlations between accidents and pilot experience and compensation. Wed, 10 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2485 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2483 On June 8, 2009, we issued our report on training failures among newly hired air traffic controllers. We conducted this review at the request of Jerry F. Costello, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Aviation. The Chairman expressed specific concerns that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was facing a high number of training failures among newly hired air traffic controllers, especially at some of the busiest and most complex facilities. As requested, our audit objectives were to determine (1) the training failure rate among newly hired air traffic controllers and (2) the common causes and factors that are contributing to this rate. While FAA is still in the early stages of replacing its controller workforce, it must begin improving how it collects and categorizes data on newly hired controllers. As large numbers of new controllers enter training in the next several years, this information will be critical for FAA, Congress, and other stakeholders to determine FAAs progress toward addressing attrition, assess training problems at individual facilities, identify needed changes to the overall training program, and monitor the performance of the ATCOTS contractor.Specifically, we found that FAAs reported rate of training failures is not accurate because (1) FAA does not track training failures among the new controllers as a separate metric; (2) FAAs current rate is based on FY 2007 training failures and will likely increase as FAA hires more new controllers between FY 2009 and FY 2017; (3) FAA does not have a uniform definition of training failures and other types of attrition; and (4) FAAs training failure data in the National Training Database were incomplete, inaccurate, or understated. To address the second part of the Chairmans request, we examined a series of factors that could indicate potential trends or root causes of training failures. We found, however, that it was premature to make such conclusions since, at the time of our review, FAA was still in the early stages of its hiring and training efforts. We are further examining this issue as part of a separate review requested by the Chairman. Our recommendations to FAA focused on developing procedures to obtain accurate data on training failures in order to effectively monitor and improve its controller training program. FAA concurred with all of our recommendations. Mon, 08 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2483 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2453 On April 23, 2009, we issued our report on controller staffing at three key California air traffic control facilities: the Los Angeles International Airport Traffic Control Tower (LAX), the Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) (SCT), and the Northern California TRACON (NCT). We conducted this review at the request of Senator Dianne Feinstein of California. Senator Feinstein expressed concerns to our office about potential shortages of trained and experienced controllers at these locations, which are among the busiest facilities within the National Airspace System. As FAA begins hiring and training nearly 17,000 new controllers nationwide through 2017, it must focus on training new controllers to the certified professional controller (CPC) level at major locations such as these while maintaining a sufficient number of veteran CPCs. Our audit objective was to evaluate FAAs plans for ensuring adequate air traffic controller staffing at the three California air traffic control facilities and to offer recommendations as needed. We found that while FAA has taken steps at LAX, SCT, and NCT to offset controller attrition, all three facilities are facing increased numbers of new controllers over the next 2 years. FAA must take several actions in the four following areas to maximize its staffing efforts and maintain enough veteran controllers at these facilities: (1) make SCT and NCT a top priority in the Agencys ongoing efforts to validate staffing ranges at large TRACON facilities, (2) expand the use of relocation and retention incentives to maintain a cadre of experienced controllers at LAX and SCT, (3) provide enough instructors and other training resources at all three facilities to handle the influx of new controllers, and (4) ensure appropriate use of overtime hours, which increased significantly at all three facilities over the last 2 years.These actions are particularly critical at SCT, which is facing the most significant staffing issues. SCT is FAAs busiest TRACON, has the highest percentage of existing and planned new controllers of the three facilities, and has experienced a sharp decline in CPCs over the last 5 years. A significant issue is that SCT expects to have over 100 controllers in training later this yearwhich is more than 40 percent of its workforce and could overwhelm SCTs training capacity. That percentage will also far exceed FAAs overall national average of 27 percent of a facilitys controller workforce in training. Thu, 23 Apr 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2453