http://www.oig.dot.gov/rss.jsp?subject=13 The 10 most recent releases on the U.S. DoT OIG web site related to Aviation Safety en-US webmaster@oig.dot.gov (OIG Webmaster) http://www.oig.dot.gov/images/dot.gif http://www.oig.dot.gov/rss.jsp?subject=13 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2565 The Office of Inspector General will review FAAs oversight of airline pilot training issues. We are conducting this review at the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security; the Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructures Subcommittee on Aviation; and Representatives Louise Slaughter, Christopher Lee, and Brian Higgins. These Members expressed concern that FAAs safety regulations and oversight governing these issues may not be effective. Accordingly, our audit objectives will be to assess (1) FAA oversight for air carrier pilot training and proficiency programs and (2) the process and data FAA and air carriers use to evaluate the competence and qualifications of pilots when they are hired. Fri, 23 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2565 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2555 At the request of the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Aviation, we will review the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAAs) safety certification process for the air traffic control system and services related to the Automatic Dependent SurveillanceBroadcast (ADSB) system. Our audit objectives are to examine FAAs revised certification procedures, as applied to ADSB, to: 1) determine the impact on FAAs statutory responsibility to maintain the safety and integrity of air traffic control systems; and 2) identify the challenges and risks associated with the private sector operating and maintaining key air traffic control systems. Wed, 21 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2555 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2550 Large, commercial air carriers have maintained an unprecedented safety record over the last several years, but regional carriers are still a safety concern as they have been involved in the last six fatal commercial accidents. The National Transportation Safety Board cited pilot performance as a potential contributory factor in four of these incidents.At the request of the Chairmen and Ranking members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and its Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security, the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General will begin a review to identify and assess trends in commercial aviation accidents including any correlations between pilot experience and compensation. Mon, 19 Oct 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2550 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2506 The Office of Inspector General plans to begin an audit of FAA regulations and airline policies governing crew rest requirements and pilot fatigue. We are conducting this review at the request of the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security. Our audit objectives are to (1) identify FAA regulations and airline policies on crew rest requirements and fatigue issues, including the role of pilots domicile and duty locations; (2) determine how FAA and airlines enforce these regulations and policies; and (3) assess how FAA and airlines update those policies and procedures to ensure they address changing conditions within the aviation industry. Tue, 14 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2506 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2511 On July 13, we issued our report on FAAs less stringent safety requirements and oversight for ondemand operators compared to larger, commercial air carriers. We conducted this audit at the request of the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and Subcommittee on Aviation, who were concerned with disparate regulatory requirements between large commercial and ondemand operators and the level of FAA oversight of ondemand operators. Our audit objectives were to (1) evaluate the differences between FAA regulation and oversight for ondemand operators and larger, commercial air carriers, and (2) identify specific issues that may hinder FAAs oversight of ondemand operators. This is the first of two reports on this audit and focuses solely on objective 1.We found that ondemand operators do not have to meet many of the regulatory requirements that large, commercial air carriers must follow. These operators also have more risk in their operating environments and receive less oversight from FAA. Further, FAA does not effectively target inspections to higherrisk ondemand operators. The number of fatalities from ondemand operations makes it imperative that FAA address our recommendations, which focused on actions FAA needs to take to enhance safety and oversight of ondemand operators as it plans regulatory and oversight changes for this growing industry. FAA concurred with all of our recommendations. Our second report addressing objective 2 will be issued later this year. Mon, 13 Jul 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2511 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2498 On June 29, 2009, we issued our report on fatigue factors that could impact air traffic controllers. We conducted this audit at three critical Chicago air traffic control facilities at the request of Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois. These 3 facilities are among the top 10 busiest in the United States, and Senator Durbin expressed concerns that staffing shortfalls, longer hours on the job, and a growing shortage of certified controllers may be causing controller fatigue. Accordingly, our audit objectives were to (1) identify and evaluate key factors that could cause controller fatigue at Chicago OHare International Airport Air Traffic Control Tower, Chicago Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility, and Chicago Air Route Traffic Control Center and (2) identify what measures FAA has taken to mitigate potential controller fatigue at these locations. We identified a number of factors at these three facilities that could create potential fatigue conditions for controllers. These include minimal hours between shifts; scheduled overtime; and onthejob training, which requires a high level of concentration and focus from the instructing controller. Facility personnel also identified other factors that could cause fatigue, including inadequate staffing levels, increased work load (i.e., traffic volume and complexity), and extended time on position or lack of position rotation.Although the National Transportation Safety Board has identified controller fatigue as a potential contributing factor in several operational errors, FAA does not consistently address human factors issues, such as fatigue and situational awareness, during its operational error investigation processes. However, FAA has begun actions at the national level to address NTSB recommendations regarding fatigue, such as amending FAA Order 7210.3 to increase the time available to controllers for rest between shifts. FAA has also developed a computerbased training module on the effects of fatigue on controller performance. At the time of our review, however, none of these actions had been implemented at the three facilities. While our review focused on only the three Chicago facilities, it is likely that the fatigue factors that we identified exist at other large air traffic control facilities throughout the Nation. Our recommendations focus on actions FAA needs to take at the national level to mitigate potential fatigue factors and enhance the level of safety of the National Airspace System. FAA generally concurred with our recommendations. Mon, 29 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2498 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2484 On June 11, 2009, the Inspector General testified before the House Subcommittee on Aviation regarding regional air carriers, pilot workforce issues, and concerns with the Federal Aviation Adminstrations (FAA) oversight of the aviation industry. Last months National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) hearing after the crash of Colgan flight 3407 highlighted the need to closely examine regulations governing pilot training and rest requirements and the oversight necessary to ensure their compliance. This is a particular concern at regional carriers, which constitute an increasing proportion of U.S. operations. The Inspector General noted several issues with regional and mainline carriers that could impact safety, such as identified differences in operating environments and potential differences in pilots flight experience, training programs, fatigue levels, and compensation. Despite these differences, FAA maintains it has one level of safety for all types of air carrier operations. The Inspector General stated that while FAA has improved some aspects of its safety oversight, there are still weaknesses in its oversight and inconsistencies in how its rules and regulations are enforced. Given the concerns with regional carriers noted by the NTSB and the vulnerabilities previously identified with FAAs safety oversight, the Subcommittee requested that the Office of Inspector General review aspects of pilot training and rest requirements. The Inspector General stated that his office recently started this review, which focuses on FAA oversight of commuter and regional pilot training, the number of training hours needed before a pilot can assume pilotincommand responsibilities, and how U.S. airlines update pilots on the latest technologies on the aircraft they operate. The review will also examine the information pilots are required to provide airlines and whether it is sufficient to verify pilot employment and training. Thu, 11 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2484 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2485 On June 10, 2009, the Inspector General testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security regarding the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) role in the oversight of air carriers. The Inspector General noted that while FAA has made progress toward improving aspects of its safety oversight, there are still vulnerabilities that must be addressed, especially in five critical areas: riskbased inspections, repair stations, aging aircraft, disclosures of safety violations made through the Aviation Safety Action Program, and internal reviews of whistleblower complaints.The Inspector General also noted operational differences between regional and mainline carriers that could impact safety and discussed his offices recently initiated review in this area. This review was requested by the Subcommittee as a result of a National Transportation Safety Board hearing last month that highlighted pilot training and fatigue issues following the crash of Colgan flight 3407. The Office of Inspector Generals review will focus on (1) aspects of pilot training, such as FAAs standards for and oversight of certification of commercial pilot training, (2) FAA regulations and airline policies regarding crew rest requirements, and (3) possible correlations between accidents and pilot experience and compensation. Wed, 10 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2485 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2483 On June 8, 2009, we issued our report on training failures among newly hired air traffic controllers. We conducted this review at the request of Jerry F. Costello, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Aviation. The Chairman expressed specific concerns that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was facing a high number of training failures among newly hired air traffic controllers, especially at some of the busiest and most complex facilities. As requested, our audit objectives were to determine (1) the training failure rate among newly hired air traffic controllers and (2) the common causes and factors that are contributing to this rate. While FAA is still in the early stages of replacing its controller workforce, it must begin improving how it collects and categorizes data on newly hired controllers. As large numbers of new controllers enter training in the next several years, this information will be critical for FAA, Congress, and other stakeholders to determine FAAs progress toward addressing attrition, assess training problems at individual facilities, identify needed changes to the overall training program, and monitor the performance of the ATCOTS contractor.Specifically, we found that FAAs reported rate of training failures is not accurate because (1) FAA does not track training failures among the new controllers as a separate metric; (2) FAAs current rate is based on FY 2007 training failures and will likely increase as FAA hires more new controllers between FY 2009 and FY 2017; (3) FAA does not have a uniform definition of training failures and other types of attrition; and (4) FAAs training failure data in the National Training Database were incomplete, inaccurate, or understated. To address the second part of the Chairmans request, we examined a series of factors that could indicate potential trends or root causes of training failures. We found, however, that it was premature to make such conclusions since, at the time of our review, FAA was still in the early stages of its hiring and training efforts. We are further examining this issue as part of a separate review requested by the Chairman. Our recommendations to FAA focused on developing procedures to obtain accurate data on training failures in order to effectively monitor and improve its controller training program. FAA concurred with all of our recommendations. Mon, 08 Jun 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2483 http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2471 On May 14, 2009, we issued our report on the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). We conducted this audit following a complaint from an FAA inspector regarding the acceptance of a fatal accident into ASAP. ASAP is a joint FAA and industry program that allows aviation employees to selfreport safety violations to air carriers and FAA without fear of reprisal. Incidents reported through ASAP by aviation employees are reviewed for acceptance by an Event Review Committee (ERC), which may also recommend corrective actions. Our audit objective was to assess FAAs implementation of ASAP and identify any improvements that will help FAA to maximize the programs safety benefits. While ASAP is a potentially valuable safety tool, we found that FAAs ineffective implementation and inadequate guidance have allowed inconsistent use and potential abuse of the program. Further, FAA has not devised a method to fully compile data reported through ASAP for analysis on a national level. Therefore, little is understood about nationwide trends in the types of violations reported under ASAP, and ASAP reports do not help FAA determine whether systemic, nationwide causes of those violations are identified and addressed.As a result of these issues, ASAP, as currently implemented, is a missed opportunity for FAA to enhance the national margin of safety. To realize the full benefits of ASAP, FAA must improve the program in the following areas: (1) revising ASAP guidance to clarify which incidents should be excluded from the program, (2) emphasizing to employees that ASAP is not an amnesty program, (3) clarifying the ERCs authority and role in ASAP and ensuring ERC members are unbiased, (4) requiring inspectors to examine repetitive reports of ASAPrelated safety concerns and enhancements to ensure effective corrective actions, and (4) developing a central database of all air carriers ASAP reports that FAA can use for trend analysis at a national level. Thu, 14 May 2009 00:00:00 GMT http://www.oig.dot.gov/item.jsp?id=2471